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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we aim to investigate whether different segments of beer products
can constitute a separate relevant product market within the framework of com-
petition law. This question gained importance when the merger between
Anheuser-Busch InBev and SABMiller became subject to a Phase II investiga-
tion by the Turkish Competition Authority in March 2016, which ultimately
ended with an unconditional clearance decision, based on an intact “beer” mar-
ket, recognizing that the relevant product market regarding beer brands in
Turkey must be wider than the premium segment. To answer the research
question above concerning relevant product market definition, we implement a
Hypothetical Monopolist Test in two steps. In the first step, the aggregate price
elasticity of demand for the premium segment is estimated econometrically by
using a nested logit demand model. This model tests whether products in the
same group are closer substitutes than products in different groups. We con-
clude that the correlation of beers within the same group is not statistically sig-
nificant. Since the data in our study are obtained at the retail level, the price
elasticity of demand at the brewer level is derived from the estimate at the
retailer level by using very conservative assumptions with regard to the pass-
through rates. In the second step, the hypothetical monopolist test is implemen-
ted by using the critical elasticity which is calculated by using the profit margins
for the premium beer segment at brewer/supplier level under both 5 percent
and 10 percent SSNIP. It is seen that the actual elasticity of demand for the
premium segment is larger than the critical elasticity (in absolute value) under
both scenarios. These findings show that the relevant product market regarding
beer brands in Turkey must be wider than the premium segment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Marketing professionals divide beer products into several segments such as
economy, mainstream, premium and super premium according to various fac-
tors. These factors include taste, origin, price of products, and the commercial
strategies of firms. However, there is no precise definition of these categories
in the marketing world and no clear lines exist between categories for position-
ing products in any one of these segments. Different market research reports
may classify the same brand under different categories. The purpose or per-
spective of a marketing professional in classifying any given beer brand under
a specific segment is likely to differ from that of a competition law enforcer/
practitioner. While a marketing professional tries to position brands in order
to create the overarching perception that consumers are offered many differen-
tiated products and numerous choices for any taste, preference or budget, a
competition law enforcer/practitioner tries to understand whether the degree
of differentiation for consumers is sufficiently significant for deciding on the
substitution possibilities among alternative products.
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether these different marketing seg-
ments can be considered as separate antitrust markets for the purposes of com-
petition law. This question has gained a particular importance when the merger
between Anheuser-Busch InBev (henceforth, AB InBev) and SABMiller was
subjected to a Phase II investigation by the Turkish Competition Authority
(henceforth, TCA) in March 2016.
In many jurisdictions, including the European Union, China and South
Africa, the acquisition of SABMiller, the world’s second largest brewer, by AB
InBev, the world’s largest brewer, required a significant and complex level of
merger control analysis, and, in some cases, was only cleared with various
negotiated conditions. In Turkey, the proposed transaction was examined in a
Phase II investigation and was ultimately cleared without any conditions.1
Despite the negligible market shares of both AB InBev and SABMiller in
the overall beer market in Turkey, the TCA, in its Phase II Notice, took the
view that there is a meaningful price gap between super premium/premium
beers and standard beers, and that the transaction contained the risk of creat-
ing a dominant position if the ‘super premium/premium beer segment’ can
be said to constitute a separate relevant product market.
The Turkish beer market is a tight duopoly. Anadolu Efes, the market
leader, produces and sells its own brands and also distributes some brands of
SABMiller. The second prominent brewer in the Turkish market is Türk
Tuborg. It produces and sells its own brands and also distributes some
brands of AB InBev. In the pre-merger situation, SABMiller held a non-
controlling minority share (24 percent) in Anadolu Efes. The TCA argued
that although AB InBev would not be acquiring control over Anadolu Efes,
1 See Turkish Competition Board, Decision No. 16–19/311–140, June 1, 2016.
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the mere acquisition of the non-controlling minority shares would create a
unity of interest between AB InBev and Anadolu Efes, based on the fact that
AB InBev would be sharing in the profit/loss of Anadolu Efes. Due to this
alleged creation of a unity of interest between AB InBev and Anadolu Efes,
the TCA further asserted that it was highly likely that AB InBev would prefer
to terminate its ongoing distribution relationship with Türk Tuborg and start
to distribute its products through Anadolu Efes. This would expand the
product portfolio of Anadolu Efes within the premium/super premium beer
segment, which might lead to the creation of a dominant position for
Anadolu Efes within that segment as well as strengthening its dominant pos-
ition in terms of the overall beer market. Therefore, the relevant market def-
inition played a critical role in the assessment of the proposed merger.
This paper proceeds as follows: First, the case law and the previous eco-
nomic analyses regarding the relevant market definition for beer segments
are reviewed. Then, the principles of a standard hypothetical monopolist test
are explained in Part III. In Part IV, the details of the econometric estimation
of the demand for beer products are presented. The implementation of the
critical loss test which is used for the relevant market definition is explained
in Part V. Finally, the findings of this analysis are summarized in the conclu-
sion which comprises Part VI.
II. CASE LAW AND PREVIOUS ECONOMIC STUDIES
Neither the TCA nor the European Commission has so far distinguished
between separate markets for “premium” and “standard” beers in their previ-
ous decisions. The beer market is one of the most familiar and closely-
watched markets for the TCA, and there have been numerous decisions
where the market dynamics of the beer market have been examined in
minute detail.2 However, in none of these earlier cases has the TCA defined
separate product markets for “premium” and “standard” beers. While the
TCA has dealt with cases concerning the premium beer segment, it has not
so far differentiated a separate market for premium beers.3
Similarly, although the European Commission has discussed whether a
further segmentation of the beer market by type (such as lager, ale and stout,
2 See Turkish Competition Authority cases; Decision No. 09-38/925-218, Anadolu Efes/Mey
İçki (Aug. 25, 2009); Decision No. 08-52/802-328, Israel Beer/Carlsberg (Sept. 11, 2008);
Decision No. 01-30/299-89, Yaşar Holding/Carlsberg (July 4, 2001); Decision No. 12-43/
1325-437, Efes/Tanmer Pazarlama (Sept. 10, 2012); Decision No. 12-38/1085-344, Efes/
Ekseli Gıda (July 18, 2012); Decision No. 12-38/1084-343, Efes/Çağ-Bil Meşrubat (July 18,
2012); Decision No. 11-64/1691-598, Anadolu Efes (Dec. 29, 2011); Decision No. 11-42/
911-281, Efes (July 13, 2011).
3 See Turkish Competition Authority cases; Decision No. 03-42/463-202, Anadolu Efes/
Brauerei Beck GmbH (June 12, 2003); Decision No. 02-70/843-347, Anadolu Efes/Miller
Brewing Company (Nov. 14, 2002); Decision No.05-20/234-69, Anadolu Efes /Carlton and
United Beverages/Foster’s Group (Mar. 1, 2005).
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as in the UK) or by quality (for example, standard vs. premium) might be
relevant in some countries, the question was ultimately left open and the
European Commission has not so far distinguished a separate market for pre-
mium beers.4 The European Commission’s findings in some of its decisions
object to defining distinct product markets for the “standard” and the “pre-
mium” segments. For example, the European Commission’s findings regard-
ing a potential differentiation between the “standard” and “premium”
segments in its Interbrew / Brauergilde decision largely support a unified prod-
uct market.5
This stance in terms of market definition is also reflected in the case law of
the federal courts in the United States, which have conducted their analyses in
the beer sector in terms of the overall beer market in a number of cases.6,7 The
Department of Justice (DoJ) has likewise historically defined the relevant prod-
uct market involving the beer industry as “all beer.” In 1966, the DoJ defined
the beer sector as a single product market in US v Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.8
Subsequently, during the DoJ’s review of the AB/InBev merger in 2008, it con-
firmed that the relevant product market definition was “all beer.”9 Most
recently, the “all beer” product market definition was once again adopted in
the DoJ’s 2013 review of the ABI/Grupo Modelo merger.10
Similarly, the Competition Bureau of Canada has consistently held that the
relevant product includes “all beer.” An early example of this view was evinced
4 See Case COMP/M.6587 Molson Coors/Starbev (June 6, 2012); Case COMP/M.4952
Carlsberg / Scottish & Newcastle Assets (Mar. 7, 2008); Case COMP/M.4999 Heineken/
Scottish & Newcastle Assets (Apr. 3, 2004); Case COMP/M.2569 Interbrew/Beck’s (Oct. 26,
2001); Case COMP/M.3032 Interbrew/Brauergilde (Dec. 19, 2002).
5 Case COMP/M.3032 Interbrew / Brauergilde, 19 December 2002, para. 11.: “Different research
and data consultancies in the drinks sector do not have common criteria to distinguish for instance pre-
mium, even “superpremium”, and standard beer. The market investigation has shown, that even
though the breweries tend to declare one or more of their brands to belong to the premium segment, there
were no common criteria for these regroupings. Indeed, it appears that different aspects such as the price
(e.g. 20% above the other beer prices), the geographic scope of distribution (e.g. nationwide), the mar-
keting expenses or just the “image” attributed to a certain brand could be decisive.”
6 U.S. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F.Supp. 475 E.D. Wisconsin (Sept. 22, 1964); Oak
Distributing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 370 F.Supp. 889, E.D. Michigan (Nov. 30, 1973);
State of N.Y. by Abrams v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 673 F.Supp. 664, E.D. New York; Package
Shop, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 675 F.Supp. 894 D. New Jersey (Oct. 19, 1987).
7 For instance, in State of N.Y. by Abrams v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F.Supp. 848, E.D. New
York Jan. 14, 1993, the District Court provided as follows: “The parties stipulated that relevant
product market for this case is all beer: alcoholic and non-alcoholic; premium and super premium;
imports and domestics. Not only have the parties stipulated to this fact, but the evidence clearly rein-
forced this designation.”
8 US v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co, 253 F Supp. 129 (ND Cal 1966) at 133-134, aff’d 385 US
37 (1966).
9 Competitive Impact Statement: U.S. v. InBev N.V./S.A., et al., United States Department of
Justice (November 14, 2008).
10 Competitive Impact Statement: U.S. v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV and Grupo Modelo S.A.
B. de C.V., United States Department of Justice (April 19, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/atr/
case-document/file/486551/download.
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in the Bureau’s 1989 review of the merger between Molson Companies
Limited and Elders IXL Limited (the parent company of Carling O’Keefe
Breweries of Canada Limited). In 2003, the Bureau investigated the relevant
product market in the beer sector during an inquiry into the Quebec beer mar-
ket and concluded that beer segments were not sufficiently distinct from one
another to constitute separate markets. Consequently, the Bureau adopted “all
beer” as the relevant product market for the purposes of its inquiry.11
Furthermore, during its 2007 review of Labatt’s acquisition of Lakeport, the
Bureau’s economic expert concluded that “beer is beer”12 while in the Bureau’s
most recent review (of the 2013 merger between AB InBev and Grupo
Modelo), the Bureau approved the transaction without ever suggesting to the
parties that it viewed the market as being narrower than “all beer.”
In economics literature, the relevant market definition mostly depends on
data about the price elasticities of demand. Hausman, Leonard and Zona have
estimated the demand elasticities of beer products by using a three-stage bud-
geting approach.13 At the top stage, they estimate the overall demand for beer.
In the middle stage, they group beer products into three segments: premium,
popular and light. In the top and middle stages, they use a log-log specification
for demand equations. At the third stage, they estimate the demand elasticities
of beer products at brand level by using an Almost Ideal Demand System.14
They estimate that the conditional own-demand elasticity for premium beers is
−2.7. In the light of this finding, they have concluded that a hypothetical
attempt to raise the price of premium beers would not be profitable if the prices
of light and popular beers were held constant. Therefore, according to their
findings, premium beers would not constitute a separate antitrust market.
Houška and Bil have assumed a two-stage budgeting, in which the overall
beer expenditure is allocated between different beer segments in the upper
level, and the demand for individual beer brands is estimated in the bottom
level.15 They investigate the following beer segments: dark beers, imported
beers, light beers (with low calorie content), craft beers (mostly only local and
produced in limited amounts), non-alcoholic beers, and premium beers (repre-
senting the mainstream beer). They use the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal
Demand System (LA-AIDS) to estimate the own-price elasticities for selected
beer segments. They estimate that the price elasticity of demand for the
11 “Inquiry Into the Quebec Beer Market,” Competition Bureau Backgrounder (April 29, 2003)
at 2.
12 M. Aitken memo to Commissioner Scott, 2007.
13 Jerry Hausman, Gregory Leonard & J.Douglas Zona, Competitive Analysis with Differentiated
Products, 34 ANNALES D’ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 166 (1994).
14 Angus Deaton & John Muellbauer, An Almost Ideal Demand System, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 312
(1980).
15 Tomáš Houška & Jaroslav Bil, Definition of relevant market in beer industry: Application of LA-
AIDS model, 30th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics,
Karviná, Czech Republic (Sept. 11–13, 2012) http://mme2012.opf.slu.cz/proceedings/pdf/
055_Houska.pdf.
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premium segment is −1.28. Moreover, they conduct a Critical Loss Analysis to
find out whether a relevant market narrower than “all beers” exists. In contrast
to the conclusions reached by Hausman, Leonard and Zona, their results show
that each of the analysed segments constitute a separate relevant market. They
have concluded that the relevant market in the beer industry appear to be nar-
rower than “all beers”.
Although both papers use variants of the same demand system (that is, the
Almost Ideal Demand System), the differences in data and in estimation techni-
ques yield different results about the elasticities of demand and the relevant mar-
ket definition. In this paper, we use a different demand system known as nested
logit demand, which allows us to estimate demand elasticities by grouping a large
number of differentiated products into segments. The data content and the
properties of the demand system employed are explained in the following parts.
III. HYPOTHETICAL MONOPOLIST TEST (SSNIP TEST)
The generally accepted method in competition economics for market defin-
ition is the Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT). The way that HMT is
implemented by European Commission is explained in the Notice on the def-
inition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law.
According to this notice, the HMT is implemented by answering the ques-
tion whether “customers of the undertaking(s) concerned would switch to
readily available substitutes in response to a hypothetical small (in the range
5 percent to 10 percent) but permanent relative price increase in the products
and areas being considered.” If the price increase results in loss of sales and
if substitution is enough to make the price increase unprofitable, additional
substitutes are included in the relevant market. If the price increase is not
profitable for the hypothetical monopolist, then it is surmised that the pro-
ducts in the candidate market would be significantly constrained by the com-
petitive pressure of alternative products, and the relevant market should be
larger than the initial set of products. If this is the case, the test proceeds by
adding the closest substitutes to the previous set of products and by applying
the “small but non-transitory increase in prices” (SSNIP) for the newer can-
didate market. If the SSNIP is not yet profitable for the hypothetical monop-
olist, the test goes on by enlarging the candidate market by adding newer
alternatives until the price increase tips into profitability. When the price
increase is profitable at any step, it is accepted that the hypothetical monop-
olist is not significantly constrained by alternative products (or firms), and
the current candidate set of products constitute the relevant product market.
As the HMT test measures the effect of a SSNIP on the demand for pro-
ducts in the candidate market, the HMT is also known as the SSNIP test.
The prices of all other products outside the candidate market are kept con-
stant. In European implementation, the SSNIP is assumed to be an increase
between 5 percent and 10 percent; however, in the United States the price
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increase may be lower or higher than 5 percent. In the current analysis, the
European approach is applied and the test is implemented by taking both
5 percent and 10 percent criteria.
The crucial point in the hypothetical monopolist test is to choose a reason-
able set of products for the first step of the test. This choice depends on the
characteristics of the market and the features of the products and their use or
perception in the eyes of the consumers. In the current analysis, it is reason-
able to choose the “premium beer segment,” as it is called in market research
reports, for the initial candidate market.
A practical way of implementing the hypothetical monopolist test is to use
Critical Loss Analysis. Critical Loss is defined as the sales which the hypo-
thetical monopolist loses in case of an SSNIP, and it leaves the profits of the
firm unchanged compared to its level before the change in prices. It simply
defines the level of decrease in sales which corresponds to a break-even point
for the profit of the hypothetical monopolist. When the SSNIP causes the
firm to lose sales exceeding the Critical Loss level, the price increase will not
be profitable for the firm. In that case, the market would be larger than the
initial candidate market. In implementing the hypothetical monopolist test,
the analyst needs information on the Actual Loss that the hypothetical mon-
opolist may incur in case of an SSNIP. The test relies basically on a compari-
son between the Critical Loss and the Actual Loss.
In practice, it is not easy to calculate or access information on the Actual
Loss. Usually, competition law practitioners use internal documents or the
results of past business strategies of firms, which may provide some guidance
to assess the Actual Loss. A better alternative is to estimate the price elasticity
of demand for the candidate relevant product market. In this paper, the
demand elasticity of the “premium” segment of beers is estimated by using
sophisticated econometric methods. Then, the Critical Elasticity, which is an
equivalent measure for Critical Loss, is calculated. Critical Elasticity gives
the threshold level of elasticity at which the price increase leaves the profit of
the hypothetical monopolist unchanged compared to its level before the price
increase. Therefore, the relevant market definition in this paper is based on
the comparison of the Critical Elasticity of the hypothetical monopolist of
premium beers to its actual price elasticity of demand.
IV. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION OF DEMAND FOR THE PREMIUM
SEGMENT
In this section, the basic assumptions and steps of the econometric model are
explained. The beer industry is characterized by product differentiation. The
econometric model used in this section takes into account this aspect of the
industry. In an industry where there are a lot of differentiated products, the most
suitable method of analysis would be to use different types of logit demand mod-
els. In these models, it is assumed that a representative consumer chooses the
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product which gives him the highest utility. The utility of the consumer
depends on the price and other product characteristics. Data which are avail-
able in this economic analysis contain information on some properties of beer
products, and help to construct meaningful explanatory variables.
The logit demand models for differentiated products were developed by
Berry (1994)16 and are widely used in the competition economics. In this
economic analysis, a nested logit demand model will be used. The advantage
of this model is that it allows the use of linear estimation methods (that is,
OLS, 2SLS, and panel estimation), and it can be used with aggregate data.
The nested logit model is an extension of the simple logit model. It relaxes
some restrictions on the pattern of substitution imposed by the simple logit
model.
In light of the above, it can be said that the nested logit demand model is
a suitable method for estimating the demand elasticities of premium beers by
using the data set that is available for this economic analysis.
In the econometric specification of the nested logit model, products for
which the elasticities will be estimated are categorized as “inside goods.”
There is also a category of “outside goods,” which are defined as the alterna-
tive products that a consumer will choose if the prices of all inside goods
increase by the same percentage.
In the nested logit demand model used in this paper, beer products are
divided into three segments (premium, mainstream and economy), and the
share of the outside goods will be determined based on certain assumptions.
After estimating the parameters of the appropriate demand model, it will be
possible to calculate the elasticity of demand for every brand as well as the
aggregate elasticity for the premium segment. The aggregate elasticity of the
premium segment will then be used as the measure of Actual Loss of the hypo-
thetical monopolist of premium beers.
A. Data
The data used in this analysis have been collected by Nielsen, the market
research company. It covers monthly sales revenues (in Turkish Liras) and
volumes (in liters) of beer products sold by retailers in off-trade channels
(supermarkets, groceries, kiosks, etc.) in the Turkish market between March
2013 and March 2016. The data also include information on product charac-
teristics such as:
– the name of the producer or importer (Anadolu Efes or Türk Tuborg),
– the type of packaging (aluminium bottle, glass bottle or can),
– the volume of the product (237ml, 250ml, 275ml, 330ml, 355ml,
382ml, 440ml, 450ml, 500ml, 550ml, 750ml or 1000ml).
16 Steven T. Berry, Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation, 25 RAND J. ECON.
242 (1994).
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The monthly average price per liter for each product is calculated by dividing
the monthly revenues by the monthly volume (in liters) of a brand and, then, to
account for the effects of inflation, it is adjusted by the Consumer Price Index
which is published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT).
Non-alcoholic beers are not included in this analysis. There are 145 dis-
tinct products in the data set and 53 of these are categorized under the “pre-
mium” segment. Only ten products are classified in the “economy” segment.
In this data, a single brand name is assigned to all product items with the
same brand name but with different volumes or packaging materials. (For
example, Efes Pilsen 500ml in can packaging and Efes Pilsen 330ml in bot-
tle packaging are assigned the same brand name, such as Efes Pilsen.)
B. The Nested Logit Demand Model and The Results
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The dependent variable comes from the theoretical foundations of the logit
demand functions as explained in Berry (1994),17 and it is the natural loga-
rithm of the relative market share of each premium product j in month t to
the total market share of “outside goods” in the same month t. Explanation
for the other variables is given in Table 1 below:




pjt Monthly average real price of premium product j in month t
α Coefficient of pjt
σ Correlation coefficient
( )|sln jt g Logarithm of the share of product j in the segment g to which it belongs
in month t
θ′ Coefficient vector for product characteristics
volumej Dummy variables for each volume type
packagej Dummy variables for each package type
strongj Dummy variable for products having alcohol content exceeding 6 percent
firmf Dummy variables for each producer/importer company
demand shifters Different demand shifters like dummy variables for each month
(January-December); dummy variables for periods in the data
γ′ Coefficient vector for demand shifters
ujt Error term
17 Berry, supra note 16.
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The model has a correlation coefficient σ as the coefficient of ( )|sln jt g ,
which is the logarithm of the share of product j in the segment to which it
belongs. Product characteristics are captured by dummy variables indicating
the volume (ml) and package type of a beer product and by dummy variables
indicating whether a beer product is strong (alcohol content exceeding 6 per-
cent). The producer or importer is also shown by a dummy variable. In order
to capture the effects of some advertising restrictions imposed on the beer
industry (along with the rest of the alcoholic drinks industry) in 2013, three
dummy variables are created, each for 2013, 2014 and for the following peri-
od in the sample. Other alternative demand shifters that can affect beer con-
sumption are dummy variables indicating the Ramadan period in which
consumers stop or reduce their alcohol consumption due to their religious
beliefs and seasonal dummy variables for capturing the seasonal effects. In
addition, a set of month-fixed effects is used as an alternative demand shifter
which captures month-specific effects on the consumers’ choice of beer.
Since price is probably correlated with the error term ujt, it is an endogen-
ous variable. To correct the endogeneity bias in the model, it is usually
recommended in the relevant literature that instrumental variables should be
used. In demand models, these suitable instruments would be the cost vari-
ables. In the demand model used in this economic analysis, the following
instrumental variables are used: one-period lagged values of the Producer
Price Index (by assuming that the Producer Price Index is a general indicator
of the change in production costs and that the current prices of beer adjust to
the changes in production costs with a time lag of one month), the exchange
rate of the Euro versus the Turkish Lira, the inflation-adjusted price of glass
products, and the inflation-adjusted price of fuel. These are given in monthly
variations. In addition, the quarterly real wage index for the beer industry is
also taken into account. Since this wage index is calculated and published
quarterly, its three-period lagged value is used as an instrumental variable.
The variable ( )|sln jt g is also assumed to be endogenous. Steven Berry sug-
gests using the characteristics of other products in the same nest to solve the
endogeneity problem related to |sjt g .
18 Berry, Levinson, Pakes (1995)19 also
advice using the observed characteristics of other products as instrumental
variables. These instruments are generally called BLP instruments shortly in
the literature with reference to the initials of these authors. The identifying
assumption in this advice is that product characteristics of other products are
exogenous and uncorrelated with the unobserved product characteristics, like
quality, which are in the error term. On the other hand, the characteristics of
other products can be correlated with the price and the market share of the
product under consideration. It is assumed that the “location” of brands in
18 Berry, supra note 16.
19 Steven Berry, Jerry Levinsohn, & Ariel Pakes, Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium, 63
ECONOMETRICA 4 (1995).
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the characteristics space is exogenous and the products that face good substi-
tutes will tend to have low markups, whereas other products will have high
markups. The markup and the market share of each brand will depend on
the distance from its nearest neighbour. Since the price is composed of mar-
ginal cost plus a markup, it will be correlated with characteristics of other
products. The same argument can be said for the market share of a product
in the nest. Therefore, the product characteristics of other products can be
used as valid and relevant instrumental variables. The BLP instruments used
in this article are the mean of the volume of items in other segments, the
mean of the volume of items of the rival firms, and the mean of indicators
assigned to the packaging of the rival firms.
With the help of these instrumental variables, the demand model esti-
mation can be performed by using the two-stage least squares method
(2SLS).
The parameter σ is expected to be between zero and one. It determines
the correlation of the utility of beers within a nest. If σ approaches one, the
utility correlation among brands within a segment is very high and consumers
perceive products of the same group as perfect substitutes for one another
relative to other products. In this case, it is meaningful to divide beer pro-
ducts into segments. On the other hand, if σ approaches zero or if it is statis-
tically zero, the correlation within the segment becomes zero and the model
reduces to the simple logit.
The potential market size and the market share of outside goods are calcu-
lated by using two different data sets provided by Nielsen about the yearly
total volume of beer in Turkey. As said previously, the main data set used in
this article basically consists of monthly sales of beer products at brand level
in Turkey. Nielsen reports another data which present only the yearly total
sales of beers in Turkey. It is observed that the yearly total quantity of beers
in the first data set is less than the total yearly quantity reported by Nielsen in
the second data set. The reason of this difference is probably the fact that the
first data set is a sub-sample of the second one. In the calculations used in
this article, the yearly total quantity of beers in the second data is accepted as
the potential market size. The difference between the total volume in second
data and the total volume in first data is accepted as the total volume of the
outside goods. Under this assumption, the market shares of the outside
goods are calculated and shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Assumed market share of the outside goods




338 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jcle/article-abstract/13/2/328/3861491
by Bilkent University Library (BILK) user
on 27 June 2018
For preparing data at monthly basis for the econometric work, the yearly market
share of the outside goods is hold constant for all months in a given year.
The results of the estimations of the nested logit model using alternative
specifications are presented in Table 3 below. According to our preliminary
regressions, the seasons and the Ramadan period have no effect on the choice
of a particular premium product with respect to brands in other segments
and the effects of these factors can be said to be the same for all types of
beers. Therefore, the regression results including these variables have been
omitted from Table 3.
In 2SLS models, the coefficient of the price is −0.83 or −0.88. They are
both statistically significant. The estimate of the correlation within nest is not
statistically significant.
The tests show that the instrumental variables are correlated with the
endogenous variables (Underidentification test) and that the correlation is
not weak (F-test). Furthermore, they are not correlated with the error term
in Models 4 (Sargan test).
C. Elasticities
Since the parameter of correlation is not statistically significant, the price
elasticities of demand for beer products can be calculated by using the esti-
mate of the coefficient of price, the price level and the market share of every
product j. The formulas for elasticities are as follows:
Own-price elasticity of demand for product j:
ε α= − ( − )p s. . 1jj j j
Cross-price elasticity of demand for product k with respect to the price of j:
ε α= p s. .jk j j
The formula for the aggregate price elasticity of demand for premium
products is derived by the authors as follows:
ε α= − ( − )p s. . 1premium premium premium
ppremium is the weighted average price of premium brands and spremium is the
aggregate market share of brands in the premium segment. The elasticities
are calculated by using the results in Model 4.
The estimates of elasticities are summarized in Table 4 below:
Since data used in this article are at monthly level, the mean of the
weighted average prices and the mean of the aggregate market shares of the
beers in the premium segment are calculated by averaging their monthly
values over 12 months in a particular year.
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Table 3. The results of the nested logit models
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OLS OLS month fixed effects 2SLS 2SLS month fixed effects
Share of outside goods is det. by Nielsen data
p −0.018*** −0.018*** −0.833*** −0.880***
lnsjt_g 0.862*** 0.862*** 0.098 0.11
strong −0.341*** −0.340*** 2.506*** 2.621***
250 0.302 0.299 −3.824*** −3.881***
275 −1.112*** −1.114*** −0.449 −0.181
300 0.024 0.02 −4.513*** −4.464***
330 −0.468** −0.472** −2.721*** −2.578***
355 −0.845*** −0.848*** −0.178 0.041
382 −1.588*** −1.589*** −0.976 −0.737
440 −0.790*** −0.792*** 0.519 0.777
450 −1.095*** −1.098*** −0.562 −0.324
500 −0.041 −0.043 −3.665*** −3.798***
550 0.552** 0.552** −3.285*** −3.432***
750 −1.327*** −1.332*** −1.357 −0.992
1000 −1.340*** −1.342*** −5.041*** −5.241***
1500 −1.785*** −1.790*** −9.656*** −9.814***
3000 −1.202 −1.201 11.840** 12.821**
5000 0.086 0.083 −7.303*** −7.364***
_bottle −0.998*** −1.003*** 3.506*** 3.702***
can −1.195*** −1.200*** 2.865*** 3.035***
pet −2.269*** −2.272*** 2.773** 2.866**
other firms 0.344*** 0.343*** (omitted) (omitted)
Pera 0.034 0.033 (omitted) (omitted)
Tuborg −0.063* −0.062* 0.716*** 0.754***
2013 −0.876*** −0.879*** −2.217*** −2.304***
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_cons 1.723*** 1.724*** 4.714** 5.057**
N 3111 3111 2824 2824
AIC 7580 7601 14000 14000
BIC 7744 7831 14000 15000
F test of excluded instruments for p F(3, 2798) = 21.44 F(3, 2787) = 20.05
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000
F test of excluded instruments for lnsjt_g F(3,2798) = 88.15 F(3, 2787) = 89.63
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald
Wald F stat.)
13.84 12.06
Underidentification test (Anderson canon.
corr. LM stat.)
41.29 36.19
p-value for Anderson canon.corr. LM stat. 0.000 0.000
Sargan statistic 2.929 2.058
p-value of Sargan test 0.087 0.151
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The mean of the weighted average prices of the premium brands is 11.03
Turkish Liras per liter in 2015. This is an inflation-adjusted mean value over
12 months in 2015. The mean of the aggregate market shares of the premium
segment is 18 percent. (The brands Efes Extra and Tuborg Special are
included in the premium segment.)
The aggregate demand elasticity of the premium segment is calculated for
every month separately by using the formula above. For this aim, first, the
monthly values of the weighted average price and the aggregate market share
of the premium beers are calculated from data, and are used along with the
estimate of the price coefficient for calculating the aggregate elasticity of the
premium segment. Then, the mean of aggregate demand elasticity of the pre-
mium segment is calculated by taking the average of its monthly values over 12
months in a particular year. For year 2015, the mean elasticity of the premium
segment is found −7.99. This is higher than the elasticity of the premium seg-
ment estimated by Hausman, Leonard and Zona,20 which is −2.7. According
to Hausman, Leonard and Zona their estimate for the elasticity of the pre-
mium segment is already quite large and they contend that it is not possible to
argue that the different segments of beer can be a separate antitrust market.
The mean of own-price elasticities of the individual premium brands is
−12.83, which illustrates that demand for premium brands is on average
quite elastic.
D. Derived Demand Elasticity at Wholesale Level
The price elasticities of demand for premium beer products presented above
are estimated by using the data at retailer level. These elasticities may not be
used directly in a Critical Loss analysis if one focuses on the relevant market
definition for a merger between brewers (such as the merger between AB
InBev and SABMiller).
One way of solving this problem is simply to assume that the retailers reflect
any percentage change in their wholesale costs to their retail prices by the same
percentage. In this case, the retail level elasticities will be equal to the wholesale
level elasticities and they can be directly used in the Critical Analysis.
Table 4. Summary statistics for beers in the premium segment in 2015 (Model 4)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ppremium 12 11.03 0.164 10.82 11.33
spremium 12 0.18 0.005 0.17 0.18
εjj 472 −12.83 5.46 −56.04 −7.30
εjk 472 0.043 0.11 0.00004 0.643
εpremium 12 −7.99 0.156 −8.30 −7.76
20 Hausman, Leonard and Zona, supra note 13.
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Another solution is to use some additional information to derive the
demand elasticities at wholesale level from retail level elasticities. The rela-
tion between elasticities at wholesale and retail levels is presented in the fol-
lowing formulas. The meanings of the parameters in these formulas are
explained in Table 5.
ε ε ε= ∗w r rw







For the purposes of this paper, we learn from industry sources that the
ratio w/p is predicted as 0.852. As for the other terms in the relation above, it
can be stated that if the retail market is monopolistic and the demand is lin-
ear, then the pass-through rate is theoretically 0.5. In reality, it is known that
the retail beer market is far from being a monopoly and the pass-through rate
is expected to be considerably higher than 0.5. In Table 6, the derived
demand elasticity at brewer (wholesale) level is calculated by assuming that
the retail level is very close to the monopolistic level, and therefore, the pass-
through rate is slightly higher than 0.50. For example, it can be taken as
0.51. This is a very conservative approach, and the pass-through rate of a typ-
ical retailer is expected to be much higher in reality.
Even under very conservative assumption, it is calculated that the derived
demand elasticity at wholesale (brewer) level is −3.47. As shown in Table 6,
when the pass-through rate of the retailer is assumed to be 0.60, the derived
demand elasticity at wholesale level increases to −4.08.
As a final word on this issue, it should be pointed out that in an academic
article written by Besanko, Dubé and Gupta,21 the pass-through rate for beer
was found to be 5.58 in the US market. This figure is quite higher than what
is assumed in this paper for the Turkish market. Even if their estimation for
the US market cannot be used directly for the Turkish market, it is a good
Table 5. Explanations for derived demand elasticity at wholesale level
Abbreviation Explanation
εw elasticity at wholesale level
εr elasticity at retail level







pass-through rate between w and p.
21 David Besanko, Jean-Pierre Dubé & Sachin Gupta, Own-Brand and Cross-Brand Retail Pass-
Through, 24 MARKETING SCIENCE 123 (2005).
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indicator that the derived demand elasticity can be much higher than those
calculated in this article in which a very conservative approach about the
pass-through rate is adopted.
At this point, these derived elasticities can be used in a Critical Loss ana-
lysis to define the relevant market.
V. APPLICATION OF THE CRITICAL LOSS ANALYSIS
The aggregate elasticities of the premium segment, which are estimated
above, can be used in implementing the Critical Loss Analysis (such as the
Hypothetical Monopolist Test) for deciding on the boundaries of the relevant
product market in the beer industry in Turkey.
At this point in our analysis, the Critical Loss (or, equivalently, the
Critical Elasticity) should be calculated for the hypothetical monopolist of all






The term m denotes the profit margin of the hypothetical monopolist and t is
the SSNIP (for example, 5 percent–10 percent). The important issue in this
analysis is to find a reliable estimate for the profit margin m. In this paper, by
using information provided by industry sources it is predicted that the average
profit margins for premium beers at wholesale level is 46.6 percent in 2015.
By using the formula above, the Critical Elasticity for 2015 is calculated
and compared to the aggregate demand elasticity of the premium segment in
Table 7 below. The aggregate demand elasticity of the premium segment can
be accepted as the elasticity which is associated with the Actual Loss.
It is evident that the actual losses of the hypothetical monopolist are great-
er than the break-even loss level (that is, Critical Elasticity is lower than the
Actual Elasticity) for both of 5 percent and 10 percent SSNIP, even with
very conservative assumptions on the pass-through rates of a typical retailer.
This result clearly shows that the relevant product market must be wider
than the segment of premium beers.
Table 6. Comparison of derived elasticity of wholesale level under conservative (where the retail
market is assumed to be very close to a monopoly) and relaxed assumptions
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If the retailer’s pass-through rate is higher than the conservative assumption
used above, the possibility of a wider market definition increases significantly.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper aimed to find an answer to the question of whether beer brands
that are classified under the premium segment constitute a separate relevant
product market for the purposes of competition law. For this purpose, the
Hypothetical Monopolist Test has been implemented.
The first step of the test is to estimate the aggregate price elasticity of
demand for the premium segment. The demand estimation has been done
by using a nested logit model, which tests whether products of the same
group are closer substitutes than products of different groups. It has been
found that the correlation of beers within the same nest is not statistically
significant.
The price elasticity of demand for the premium segment at the brewer
level has been derived from the estimate at retail level by using very conserva-
tive assumptions regarding the pass-through rates at retail level. The demand
elasticity at brewer level calculated in this way is at least −3.47. If the
assumption on the pass-through rates can be relaxed, the derived demand
elasticity at brewer level would be even higher (in absolute value).
In the second step of the hypothetical monopolist test, alternative mea-
sures of the critical elasticity have been calculated by using information on
the profit margin for the premium beer segment at brewer/supplier level
under both 5 percent and 10 percent SSNIP scenarios. It has been shown
that actual elasticity of demand for the premium segment is higher than the
critical elasticity (in absolute value) under both scenarios of SSNIP.
These findings lead to the conclusion that the relevant product market
regarding beer brands in Turkey must be wider than the premium segment.






Actual Elasticity based on the
most conservative assumption
Conclusion
46.6% 5% −1.94 −3.47 Relevant Market is wider
than Premium
Segment
46.6% 10% −1.77 −3.47 Relevant Market is wider
than Premium
Segment
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